Disciplines / Research questions

Philosophy

10 research topics · 35 questions

How strongly does pessimistic meta-induction challenge scientific realism?3 questions
  1. Adjudicating the comparative epistemic force of the pessimistic inductions over antirealists and pessimists versus the no-miracles argument

  2. Completing (or defeating) Doppelt's reconstructed scientific realism: the new pessimistic meta-induction over superseded standards and the operationalization of epistemic-virtue standards

  3. The incompatibility-based pessimistic induction against selective scientific realism: open questions on the delimitation, scope, and probabilistic grounding of selective realist commitment

Moral luck challenges the conditions of responsibility attribution3 questions
  1. Balancing fairness against significance in blame and punishment: the unfinished research program of the significance-based vindication of moral luck

  2. Outcome-driven blame as hindsight bias or a distinct quality-of-will proxy: completing and testing Levy's evolutionary dissolution of resultant moral luck

  3. Completing the control-based theory of blameworthiness after moral luck: the control condition, the epistemic condition, excuses, and the simplicity comparison

The Split Brain Counterexample of Personal Identity and the Psychological Continuity Standard4 questions
  1. Individuating minds in split-brain subjects: an integration criterion, its grounding in the mind-consciousness-brain dependency, and the metaphysics and ethics of two-mind persons

  2. Can a Refined Aristotelian Hylomorphic Theory of Personal Identity Accommodate Both Ordinary and Extraordinary Cases?

  3. How to count persons with two person-level cerebral hemispheres: adjudicating the Multiple Person View and its rivals

  4. Two Minds, How Many Persons? Settling the Effection/Transduction Premise and the Personhood of the Split-Brain Subject's Minds R and L

How prevalent is underdetermination of theories in actual historical cases of science?3 questions
  1. Establishing the generality of the problem of unconceived alternatives: historical prevalence, community-level vulnerability, and criteria for genuine failures of conception

  2. Does transient underdetermination, in its measure-theoretic form, actually obtain in science? The untested empirical supposition behind Hoyningen-Huene's refutation of the Miracle Argument

  3. Measuring the prevalence and subfield distribution of residual theoretical underdetermination across the sciences

Authorship and Intent Requirements for AI-Generated Works4 questions
  1. Liability and responsibility attribution for preter-intentional generative AI: giving Redaelli's preter-intentionality determinate ethical and legal content

  2. Art-status and authorship of AI-generated images: a general account and the conditions for model-as-author status

  3. The 'strong view' of machine artistic agency: can creative machines, or human–machine systems, be genuine artistic agents?

  4. The artist's-role condition for machine-produced art: what must the artist do for an automated artifact to be admissible as an artwork?

Is the no-miracles argument circular?4 questions
  1. Non-circular grounds for the explanationist (No Miracles) defense of scientific realism

  2. Naturalistic vindication of the no-miracles argument for scientific realism: predictive novelty, unification, and the strict-parity dilemma

  3. Non-circular foundations for the No-Miracles Argument: individuating inference to the best explanation, warranting its time-stable reliability, and package-level alternatives to reliabilism

  4. Can a Non-Question-Begging Reliabilism Underwrite the Abductive (No-Miracles) Argument for Scientific Realism?

Can machine testimony under the Neo-Kantian framework generate knowledge?4 questions
  1. Can Machine Outputs Be Testimony? Machine Testimony, Knowledge, and the Extension of the Kantian Non-Reductionist Account to Artificial Testifiers

  2. Judgment-form attribution to AI systems: Kantian categories, machine-specific forms of judgment, and criteria for functional implementation of concepts

  3. Unresolved issues in Humphreys' network epistemology: knowledge, testimony, and trust in fully automated networked science

  4. The Stability and Scope of Kant's Anti-Reductionist Theory of Testimony

Can the hard problem of consciousness and the explanatory gap be reduced to conceptual problems?4 questions
  1. The scientific status of the hard problem's explanatory demand: can consciousness science deliver a control explanation of phenomenal consciousness, and do alternative accounts of scientific explanation reinstate the hard problem?

  2. Why the intuition of mind–brain dualism persists: the undecided empirical explanation of the explanatory-gap intuition

  3. Closing the restricted hard problem of consciousness: co-reference of phenomenal and physical concepts

  4. Adjudicating the definitional dispute over 'phenomenal consciousness' between illusionism and anti-illusionism

Compatibility of the causal exclusion problem with non-reductive physicalism4 questions
  1. Can interventionist causal theory empirically ground non-reductive mental-to-physical causation? The unresolved issues for (M*)–(IV*) interventionism: principle (†), epiphenomenalist underdetermination, and the adequacy of modified interventionism

  2. The soundness of the causal exclusion argument reformulated in terms of physical sufficiency

  3. The open core of the strengthened exclusion argument: can role functionalism vindicate mental causation against Parthood, Nonredundancy, and the core/total realizer demarcation?

  4. The open core of the causal exclusion problem: do intimate vertical relations between mental and physical events actually hold, and is non-reductive physicalism consistent with hardline horizontalism?

The Patching Dilemma of Sufficient Knowledge Conditions After the Gettier Counterexample2 questions
  1. Which Veritic Luck Is Compatible with Knowledge? A Systematic Demarcation and a Positive Theory of Luck-Tolerant Knowledge

  2. Specifying safety and quasi-factive evidence for the knowledge-first package: closeness, method-relativization, and the epistemic status of measurement reports

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